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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
of federal policy, an analogy to elections in a political context is
valid. Employees' freedom of choice exercised in a formal election
should be binding, short of an unusual circumstance, until another
election is possible. Congress has sought to establish a period of
stability after an election. This formality of an election is meaning-
less if the NLRB can, within one year after an election, disrupt the
stability by issuing orders to bargain, based upon showings of ma-
jority status attained through informal means. Stability in labor-
management relations can best be achieved within a context of cer-
tainty. Decisions such as Brooks make this certainty mandatory
when an election results in victory for a bargaining agent. To
apply a different rule when a certified election results in defeat of a
union is arbitrary and unfair.
GEORGE CARSON II
Labor Law-'Outsiders' As Agents of the Employer
Any coercive, antiunion activities by persons acting as agents
of an employer covered by the Labor Management Relations Act
will be imputed to him and the union concerned will have a remedy
before the National Labor Relations Board.2 However, those
persons found not to be agents are beyond the reach of the law
and consequently are free to continue at will their antiunion ac-
tivities. Thus, an important aspect of labor legislation is the con-
cept of agency, as it will often determine employer responsibilities.
Under the original provision of the Wagner Act of 1935,' the
term "employer" included "any person acting in the interests of an
employer, directly or indirectly. . . .' Using this language of the
act, the NLRB imputed to employers the actions of third parties,
even those only remotely connected with the employer.5 This was
Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 2(2), 61 Stat.
137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1965).
2 Hereinafter referred to as NLRB.
'Act of July 5, 1935, § 2(2), 49 Stat. 450.
'Act of July 5, 1935, § 2(2), 49 Stat. 450.
H.R. REP. No. 244, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 18 (1947). The committee
report said:
The Board frequently "imputed" to employers anything that anyone
connected with an employer, no matter how remotely, said or did,
notwithstanding that the employer had not authorized the action and




done even though there existed no principal-agent relationship.'
However, Congress, in passing the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, de-
leted the above language and inserted in section 2(2) language
more favorable to management by defining an employer as including
"any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirect-
ly. . . ."' The purpose of this section seems to have been to restrict
the prior liberal agency principles of the Wagner Act by requiring
a common law principal-agent relationship between the employer
and the third party.' At the same time, in section 2(13) of the Taft-
Hartley Act, Congress also provided that in determining whether a
person is acting as an agent of another, "the question of whether the
specific acts performed were actually authorized or subsequently
ratified shall not be controlling."9  This section was apparently
designed primarily to liberalize prior strict agency principles ap-
plicable to unions so that they would be more amenable to unfair
labor practice charges and suits for damages in courts of law.'
Where supervisory employees commit the alleged coercive acts,
these sections seem to have effected little change in the law that
existed prior to their enactment. In general the cases rely upon
International Assoc. of Machinists v. NLRB,"1 decided before
To the same effect Sen. Pepper said:
Under present law [prior to 1947], it is not necessary to have a
directly authorized agent of a corporation to bind it if a wrong is
done a worker. If a trade association acted in the interests and
with the point of view of the employer, the employer, therefore,
might have been responsible for a large number of acts of people
acting in his interests against workers .... [The Taft-Hartley Bill]
•. . carefully limits the employers liability to the acts of duly author-
ized agents.
93 CoNG. REc. 6521 (1947). (Emphasis added.)
' H.R. RE,. No. 244, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 18 (1947).
' Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 2(2), 61 Stat.
137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1965).
See note 5 supra. See also 93 Cong. Rec. 7001 (1947).
'Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 2(13), 61
Stat. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(13) (1965).
"0 Section 2(13) was directed primarily at labor. Prior to the Taft-
Hartley Act, the Supreme Court held in United Brotherhood of Carpenters
& Joiners v. United States, 330 U.S. 395 (1947), that very strict rules of
agency were applicable to unions. The proponents of the Taft-Hartley Act
wanted to enact laws prohibiting union unfair labor practices and to give
employers rights to sue for damages in courts of law. So they enacted
section 2(13) to insure that the rule of United Brotherhood of Carpenters -
would not be applied by liberalizing the law of agency applicable to unions.
See 93 CONG. REc. 7000 (1947). See also UMW v. Patton, 211 F.2d 742
(4th Cir. 1954).311 U.S. 72 (1940).
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sections 2(2) and 2(13) were enacted. There the Court held that
the employer was liable for the unauthorized acts of supervisory
employees. It indicated that if strict principles of respondeat superior
were to be applied, the employer might not be liable. 2 While the
legislative history indicates that section 2(2) was designed in part
to overrule the Machinists case,' 3 the courts seem consistently. to
cite section 2(13) for the proposition that the decision has not been
overruled. In NLRB v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co.,'4 the court
said that in "interpreting ... [section 2(13)] . . . the courts have
held that strict principles of agency are not required ... in determin-
ing an employer's liability for the union activities of its supervisory
employees." 5
Where unauthorized activities are carried on by "outsiders" or
"volunteers," the real change created by these sections appears.
These outsiders are non-employees, such as local police, businessmen,
public officials, religious leaders, or members of the employer's
family. Generally, by applying these sections the NLRB is able to
impute outsiders' acts to the employer on the basis of apparent
authority or ratification where there is some nexus of identification
between the employer and the outsider such that the employees could
2Id. at 80.
10 "The apparent intention of the redefinition of section 2(2) is to change
the rule, adopted by the Supreme Court in International Association of
Machinists v. NLRB (311 U.S. 72), that an employer is responsible for the
actions of his supervisory employees, even though he might not be under
strict common law rules." 93 CONG. RIc. 6660 (1947) (remarks of Sen.
Murray). Senator Murray was an opponent of the Taft-Hartley Act.
No statement could be found in the lezislative history by any proponent of
the Act specifically stating that the Machinists case was to be overruled.
However, Senator Taft repeatedly said that the intention was to require the
application of common law agency principles, which the Court in Machin-
ists had refused to do. See 93 CONG. REC. 4561, 6690, 7001 (1947).
1'333 F.2d 790 (8th Cir. 1964).
" Id. at 796. In Local 636, Plumbing & Pipe Fitters Independent of the
United States v. NLRB, 287 F.2d 354, 359 (D.C. Cir. 1961), it was said:
"We know of nothing in the Act of 1947 or in the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C.A. § 401 et seq., which
affects the vitality of ... [the Machinists doctrine]." See also NLRB v.
Champa Linen Service Co., 324 F.2d 28 (10th Cir. 1961); NLRB v. Des
Moines Foods Inc., 296 F.2d 285 (8th Cir. 1961); NLRB v. Birmingham
Publishing Co., 262 F.2d 8 (5th Cir. 1969).
Where non-supervisory, rank and file employees commit the unlawful
acts, the employer generally will not be liable unless he authorizes or ratifies
such conduct. Daykin, Liability of Unions and Employers Under the Labor-
Management Relations Act, 42 IowA L. REv. 370, 371 (1957).
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reasonably assume that the outsider spoke with his approval.' This
determination is, of course, a factual one and depends upon the
circumstances of each case. For example, where the outsider is a
member of the employer's family, the NLRB has little difficulty in
imputing these acts to the employer since the family relationship
gives rise to the requisite identification between the employer and
the third party."
Applying this same rationale, the NLRB has also found prin-
cipal-agent relationships where the outsiders are local businessmen
or public officials. These determinations are usually based upon
facts that indicate a close relationship between the employer and
the outsider, such as where the outsiders helped to establish the
plant"8 or where the employer allowed them to come to the plant
to make unlawful speeches.' 9 When this relationship exists, the
employer will be liable even though he had no knowledge of the
outsider's antiunion activity.2" However, he can escape liability if
he effectively disavows the outsiders' acts and communicates his
disavowal to the employees.2 ' If no effective disavowal is made,
he will be deemed to have acquiesed in the illegal acts of the out-
siders.22 Where no close relationship exists, it seems that the com-
mon law agency requirements of section 2(2) prevent imputing the
6 See, e.g., Colson Corp. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 128 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied 382 U.S. 904 (1965)."See, e.g., Star Baby Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 678 (1963); Forston Co., 139
N.L.R.B. 561 (1962); Mansbach Metal Co., 83 N.L.R.B. 797 (1953);
Taylor Mfg. Co., 83 N.L.R.B. 142 (1949).
"8E.g., Colson Corp. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 128 (8th Cir.), cert. denied
382 U.S. 904 (1965); A. M. Andrews Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 626 (1956).
"9 E.g., Byrds Mfg. Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 147 (1962); Pearson Corp., 138
N.L.R.B. 910 (1962); Wayline, Inc., 81 N.L.R.B. 511 (1949). Cf. Living-
ston Shirt Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 400 (1948).
However, the rules normally applied to outsiders are not followed where
the police engage in anti-union activity. At least one circuit has indicated
that it is more difficult to impute the acts of police to the employer, even
where they are engaging in coercive activity, because they also act within
the scope of their legal duty. See NLBR v. Bibb Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 825
(5th Cir. 1951); NLRB v. Russel Mfg. Co., 187 F.2d 296 (5th Cir. 1951).
20 Pearson Corp., 138 N.L.R.B. 910 (1962). But see Byrds Mfg. Co.,
140 N.L.R.B. 147 (1962).
1 The disavowal is not sufficient to allow the employer to escape liability
unless it is communicated to the employees. NLRB v. Fulton Bag & Cotton
Mills, 175 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1949); Indiana Metal Products, 100 N.L.R.B.
1040 (1952). And the employer cannot wait until the last minute before
making his disavowal known to his employees. See Colson Corp. v. NLRB,
347 F.2d 128 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 382 U.S. 904 (1965).
'E.g., Byrds Mfg. Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 147 (1962); Wayline, Inc., 81
N.L.R.B. 511 (1949).
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acts of outsiders to the employer. The aggrieved union does have a
remedy in representation election cases. Here, notwithstanding the
lack of an agency relationship, the NLRB will set aside the election
where the laboratory conditions necessary for a free election have
been destroyed.2"
The recent case of Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. NLRB24
is an example of application of the above rules. There the local
businessmen of a small town were desirous of improving its economy.
They were successful in inducing a large shirt manufacturer to lo-
cate a subsidiary, the respondent company, there. They agreed to
float a bond issue to finance a permanent physical plant, and also
recommended certain people for jobs. Within a short period of time
the Amalgamated Clothing Workers began to organize. At the
same time, the local businessmen, fearful that the plant would
move if unionized, began their antiunion campaign. They enlisted
the support of a local minister who spoke to his parishioners, many
of whom were employees, to the effect that the plant might move.
Workers were visited in their homes and were told of adverse eco-
nomic conditions that might follow if the union were successful in
its organization of the plant. An advertisement was placed in the
local paper asking that the workers vote "no" at the representation
election. Although the employer did not engage in the open anti-
union campaign and stated that the plant would not move if the
union came in, he was at one time evasive when questioned on this
point.
The trial examiner found the outsiders' acts to be in violation
of section 8(a) (1)" and imputed them to the employer.2" The
NLRB adopted his opinion as its own and enforcement was granted
by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
7
The trial examiner found that the employer did not authorize the
outsiders to speak for him in that there was "no evidence that the
" See, e.g., James Lee & Sons, 130 N.L.R.B. 290 (1961); Monarch
Rubber Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 81 (1958); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 120
N.L.R.B. 765 (1958); Falmouth Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 896 (1955).
263 L.R.R.M. 2581 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 15, 1966), enforcing Hamburg
Shirt Corp., 156 N.L.R.B. No. 51 (Dec. 30, 1965).
" National Labor Relations Act § 8(a) (1), 41 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a) (1) (1965), reads "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer-(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the ex-
ercise of their rights guaranteed in section 7;. ..
2" 156 N.L.R.B. No. 51 at 18.
2763 L.R.R.M. 2581 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 15, 1966).
[VCol. 45
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respondent requested these men to make such threats."2 He said
it was apparent that "they did so of their own volition... [because]
they feared that the respondent would not accept the plant if the
union came in . ... "29 Notwithstanding this lack of actual authority,
the employer was found liable in that his silence was taken as a rati-
fication of the acts of the businessmen."
Three factors seem to underlie this decision. First, the local
businessmen, after initially identifying themselves with the employer,
continued to be more than mere "passive spectators" 81 in that they
spoke to employees about their shortcomings in terms of output and
production. Also, they not infrequently visited the plant. Second,
the employer himself engaged in questionable activity, which the
court termed "marginal promises of benefit and portents of reprisal to
avoid recognizing the union until its status could be undermined."8
Third, the employer failed to unequivocally repudiate the acts of the
outsiders, and was evasive as to whether the plant would move if
the union were successful in its organization drive.
33
Clothing Workers represents the traditional approach taken by
the NLRB where outsiders engage in antiunion activity. However,
certain language of the court of appeals seems to have opened the
way for a return to the principles of the Wagner Act.34 The court
affirmed the NLRB finding that the employer had ratified the out-
siders' acts.35 In so doing the court relied upon section 2(13) for
the proposition that "responsibility ... is not controlled by the law
of agency.""0 This language seems to indicate that by utilizing
section 2(13), the agency hurdles of section 2(2) may be overcome
to expand employer responsibility to cover a broader range of con-
duct on the part of non-employees who engage in unlawful acts.
In recent congressional hearings several union leaders pointed
out the problems of outside community pressure to the House Sub-
committee on the National Labor Relations Board.3 7 The sub-
8 156 N.L.R.B. No. 51 at 18.
2 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
8163 L.R.R.M. at 2583.
2 Id. at 2583.
33 Id. at 2583.
" See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
" 63 L.R.R.M. at 2583.
"Id. at 2583.
'7 STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONs BOARD,
HousE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, 87TH CONG., 2D SEss., ADMINIS-
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committee heard testimony that some outside community pressure
exists in the form of local liscensing ordinances that purport to
require liscensing for soliciting membership in organizations or
distributing literature.38 While the constitutionality of these ordi-
nances has been successfully challenged,39 the necessary litigation
results in frustrating delay." The subcommittee found that this form
of community pressure was violative of rights secured by the Con-
stitution and laws of the United States, often occurring under color
of law, and recommended that the Department of Justice determine
whether the situation could be dealt with under existing civil rights
statutes.41 It remains to be seen whether criminal prosecutions can
be had under the civil rights statutes of those found to be acting
pursuant to these ordinances.42 In the meantime it is hoped that
TRATION OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT BY THE NLRB 59-61
(Comm. Print 1961). The committee report said in part:
This subcommittee has received testimony that union organizers have
been physically escorted by local law enforcement agents to the town
limits and told not to return. This subcommittee has received evi-
dence that town bankers call in loans of union adherents on the eve
of elections. This subcommittee has received evidence that local
merchants, including grocers, inquire as to the prounion attitude of
the customer before extending credit.
One union leader testified that "these volunteers are no more volunteers
than the Chinese Communists that invaded North Korea against the United
Nations. They are nothing but willing henchmen and associates of em-
ployers." Statement of Jacob Scheinkman, General Counsel, Amalgamated
Clothing Workers, AFL-CIO, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the
National Labor Relations Board of the House Committee on Education and
Labor, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 1, at 601 (1961) [hereinafter cited
as 1961 Hearings].
"1961 Hearings Pt. 1, at 562.
" See, e.g., Denton v. The City of Carrolton, 235 F.2d 481 (5th Cir.
1956).
101961 Hearings Pt. 1, at 562.
" STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATONS BOARD, note
37 supra.
"The pertinent civil rights statutes are 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 (1950).
Section 242 makes it illegal to deny, under color of law, inhabitants of the
United States their rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States. Research reveals no reported case wherein a person has
been charged under this provision of violating another's section 7 rights.
See note 43 infra. Section 241 makes it illegal for two or more persons to
conspire to injure, threaten, intimidate, or oppress any citizen in the exer-
cise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Consti-
tution or laws of the United States. In United States v. Bailes, 120 F. Supp.
614 (S.D.W.Va. 1954), the defendants were charged under section 241 with
conspiring to violate a person's right under section 7 not to join, form,
or assist a labor union. The court held that section 241 protected rights that
citizens possess as such or rights wholly dependent upon an act of Congress.
The court said that the right not to join a union did not fall within either
[Vol. 45
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courts will follow the precedent of Clothing Workers, i.e., the ap-
plication of liberal agency principles. Such results would appear de-
sirable since outside community pressure seems a major obstacle
to the attainment of basic section 7 rights, 43 one that merely setting
aside the representation election cannot fully remedy.44
TommY W. JARRETT
Labor Law-Representation Elections-Union Right to Employee
Mailing Lists
In February, 1966, the National Labor Relations Board ex-
pounded a new rule governing future cases involving representation
elections. The rule provides that after an election has been agreed
to by the parties or directed by the regional director, the employer
is required to "file with the Regional Director an election eligibility
list, containing the names and addresses of all the eligible voters.
The Regional Director, in turn, shall make this information avail-
category because section 7 rights are guaranteed to employees, not to
citizens generally and because the right not to join a union, as guaranteed
in section 7, is not wholly dependent upon an act of Congress because this
right is only the embodiment of employees' pre-existing rights. Id. at 628.
The court also stated that the NLRB and not the courts is to determine
what constitutes an unfair labor practice. Furthermore, the court reasoned
that since the Taft-Hartley Act only covers acts by employers, unions, or
their agents, the states, and not the federal government, must punish others
who might conspire to violate the rights of workers. Id. at 631. See also
United States v. Moore, 129 Fed. 630 (N.D.Ala. Cir. 1904), where the
court held that section 241 was not available to protect a miner in his right
to organize because this right existed because of his status as an employee,
not because of his being a citizen. Cf. UMW v. Patton, 211 F.2d 742 (4th
Cir. 1954) (court denied recovery of punitive damages).
"' Section 7 is the basic provision of labor law. It reads in part: Em-
ployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, to join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for mutual aid
or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such
activities .... National Labor Relations Act § 7, 41 Stat. 452 (1935), as
amended, Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 7, 61
Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1965).
"Once the requisite laboratory conditions have been upset, it seems that
they, to a large degree, remain so during the second election. It was found
that after the election was "tainted," the party losing has about a one-in-
three chance of winning the second. Pollitt, NLRB Re-Run Elections, 41
N.C.L. REv. 209 (1963). Also, it seems that antiunion elements, particularly
in the South, have a ready made issue to use against unions in the form of
race hate. See Pollitt, The National Labor Relations Board and Race Hate
Propaganda in Union Organizational Drives, 17 STAN. L. R.v. 373 (1965).
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